Abstract. Secure set intersection protocols are the core building block for a manifold of privacy-preserving applications.
Introduction
A variety of applications with sophisticated privacy requirements can be based on secure set operations, in particular secure set intersection. Examples are versatile and range from government agencies comparing their databases of suspects on a national and international basis, to competing enterprises evaluating their performance on various aspects (items, deployed processes), to dating services.
The underlying protocols typically involve two mistrusting parties who compute an intersection of their respective sets (or some function of them). As we elaborate in §1.1 on related work, cryptographic research has proposed several solutions to this problem, each having its own strengths and weaknesses; in particular, the efficiency aspect is crucial for deployment in real-life scenarios: While software-based solutions use expensive public-key operations, it is also possible to incorporate a tamper-proof hardware token into the protocol, yielding more efficient schemes and/or avoiding impossibility results. However, this hardwarebased model requires a strong trust model, i.e., a token trusted by all parties.
Background. In this paper we will focus on a recent proposal by Hazay and Lindell [1] that aims to design truly practical and secure set intersection protocols by introducing a new party, a (tamper-proof) hardware token T . Here, one party, called the issuer A, programs a key into the token T which protects this key from being accessible by the other party B. At the same time, the manufacturer of the token ensures that the token correctly computes the intended function, i.e., A can only choose the secret key but cannot interfere with the token's program. The protocol is very efficient and requires the involved parties and the token to perform a few pseudorandom permutation evaluations, thus disposing of any public-key operations and/or random oracles as in previous efforts (cf.
§1.1).
The use of the token in [1] is justified when trusted hardware manufacturers are available (e.g., manufacturers which produce high-end smartcards that have FIPS 140-2, level 3 or 4 certification). The security of the scheme is proven in the Universal Composability (UC) model [2] , guaranteeing security even when composed with other protocols. It is important to note that today's high-end smartcards may have a sufficient amount of resources for executing the entire ideal functionality in a relatively simple use-case such as set intersection, although probably not on relatively large inputs. However, doing so would require to program the smartcard to implement this specific functionality. The protocols of [1] as well as the protocols we propose, on the other hand, can be run in practice by using cheap smartcards: they assume limited computation capabilities (only symmetric-key operations) and constant storage (see also [1] ).
Motivation. The security proof of the scheme of [1] considers the universal composability framework inherently relying on the trustworthiness of the token, since it is assumed that both parties fully trust the token. This assumption, though, is critical with regard to several aspects regarding to what level tokens can be trusted in practice.
First, even extensive testing of the token cannot provide protection against errors and backdoors, introduced accidentally or deliberately in the underlying hardware and software stack running on it. A well-known example is the "Pentium bug" which caused the floating point division unit of the Intel Pentium TM processor to compute slightly wrong results for specific inputs [3] . Such flaws in the hardware can be exploited in so called "bug attacks" [4] to break the security of the underlying protocol. Moreover, although appropriate certification
